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Shifting the Paradigm of the Debate: A Proposal to 
Eliminate At-Will Employment and Implement a 
“Mandatory Arbitration Act” 
ZEV J. EIGEN*, NICHOLAS F. MENILLO** & DAVID SHERWYN*** 
INTRODUCTION 
The debate over the mandatory arbitration of employment discrimination cases 
has been raging since the Supreme Court’s 1991 decision in Gilmer v. 
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.1 Detractors argue that predispute mandatory 
arbitration is inherently unfair and should be prohibited.2 Advocates contend that 
arbitration3 offers significant advantages over litigation as a means of resolving 
employment rights disputes.4 In 1999, we examined the anti-arbitration arguments 
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 1. 500 U.S. 20, 23 (1991) (finding enforceable a predispute agreement compelling 
arbitration of statutory discrimination claims). 
 2. See, e.g., David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business: 
Employee and Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 WIS. L. 
REV. 33, 36, 125–31 (arguing that Gilmer “created a monster,” and that predispute 
mandatory arbitration agreements should not be enforced); Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping 
Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1631, 1674–75 (2005) (“Mandatory 
private arbitration . . . is indeed unjust . . . .”); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Mandatory 
Arbitration of Individual Employment Rights: The Yellow Dog Contract of the 1990s, 73 
DENV. U. L. REV. 1017, 1040 (1996); cf. Ronald Turner, Compulsory Arbitration of 
Employment Discrimination Claims with Special Reference to the Three A’s—Access, 
Adjudication, and Acceptability, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 231, 290 (1996) (“[C]ompulsory 
arbitration, while lawful, is not acceptable and should not be enforced absent the 
establishment of certain safeguards and processes . . . .”). 
 3. In the interest of brevity, we often refer to “arbitration” where we mean 
“mandatory” arbitration or “mandatory pre-dispute” arbitration. 
 4. See, e.g., Samuel Estreicher & Zev J. Eigen, The Forum for Adjudication of 
Employment Disputes, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF LABOR AND 
EMPLOYMENT LAW (Michael L. Wachter & Cynthia Estlund eds., 2010); Samuel Estreicher, 
Saturns for Rickshaws: The Stakes in the Debate over Predispute Employment Arbitration 
Agreements, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 559, 563 (2001) (“[A]rbitration . . . can do a 
better job of delivering accessible justice for average claimants than a litigation-based 
approach.”); Elizabeth Hill, Due Process at Low Cost: An Empirical Study of Employment 
Arbitration Under the Auspices of the American Arbitration Association, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON 
DISP. RESOL. 777, 824 (2003) (arguing arbitration offers affordable and substantial due 
process to middle- and lower-income employees under mandatory arbitration agreements); 
David Sherwyn, Because It Takes Two: Why Post-Dispute Voluntary Arbitration Programs 
Will Fail to Fix the Problems Associated with Employment Discrimination Law 
Adjudication, 24 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 21 (2003) (“[A]rbitration is like a granola 
bar; not quite as sweet as the candy [i.e., mediation], tasty nonetheless, healthy in the long 
run and certainly better than the alternative, costly and drawn-out litigation—like a plate of 
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and proposed a statute that we believed addressed the most salient concerns 
commonly voiced.5 While the article has been cited over fifty times, our 
“Mandatory Arbitration Act” (MAA) has never caught on, and, sadly (for us), has 
not played the role we envisioned for it in the ongoing arbitration debate. Thus, 
instead of focusing energies on developing a working model that capitalizes on the 
best aspects of arbitration and litigation in discrimination adjudication, scholars 
(including the authors of this Article) have continued to debate which is the 
preferred method for adjudication, as if the Hobson’s choice were any more than 
illusory, and as if this were ultimately a productive use of time, given authors’ 
views on both sides of the debate about problems inherent in the current system of 
resolving employment rights disputes. Indeed both David Schwartz and Dave 
Sherwyn have published articles on: (1) the mandatory versus voluntary debate—
we disagree6 and (2) the empirical examination of arbitration versus litigation—we 
somewhat agree.7 Professor Schwartz and the coauthors of this Article agree that 
the debate is flawed because regardless of how many cases we examine, the cases 
adjudicated in arbitration are qualitatively distinct from those resolved in litigation; 
thus, we will never ascertain from the relative strength or weakness of the cases and 
their outcomes, anything informative about the preferability or ultimate fairness of 
the forum.8  
Much has been written about arbitration since we last copublished on this topic 
in 1999—including Professor Schwartz’s fine piece in the Notre Dame Law 
Review.9 We initially intended to simply continue the debate in this Article because 
we have not addressed the latest anti-arbitration arguments. In the back of our 
minds, however, was a persistent nagging belief that the two sides are now so 
entrenched and polarized in their respective conclusions that it would be unlikely 
for minds to change on either side.10 It seems to many detractors of mandatory 
                                                                                                                 
liver and onions with a side of over-cooked brussel [sic] sprouts.”). 
 5. See David Sherwyn, J. Bruce Tracey & Zev J. Eigen, In Defense of Mandatory 
Arbitration of Employment Disputes: Saving the Baby, Tossing Out the Bath Water, and 
Constructing a New Sink in the Process, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 73, 125–37 (1999). 
 6. Compare Schwartz, supra note 2, at 53–66, 119 (arguing that while predispute 
mandatory arbitration agreements are fundamentally unfair, in the postdispute setting the 
plaintiff is in a better position to decide whether to submit to arbitration), and David S. 
Schwartz, If You Love Arbitration, Set It Free: How “Mandatory” Undermines 
“Arbitration”, 8 NEV. L.J. 400, 421–22 (2007) [hereinafter Schwartz, Set It Free] (calling 
for congressional action rejecting predispute arbitration agreements), with Sherwyn, supra 
note 4, at 65–68 (arguing that postdispute voluntary arbitration would incur abysmal 
participation and, at the same time, eliminate the benefits of predispute arbitration 
agreements). 
 7. Compare David S. Schwartz, Mandatory Arbitration and Fairness, 84 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 1247, 1283–1315 (2009) (identifying flaws in empirical analyses comparing 
litigation with arbitration and arguing the results tend to support that mandatory arbitration is 
unfair), with David Sherwyn, Samuel Estreicher & Michael Heise, Assessing the Case for 
Employment Arbitration: A New Path for Empirical Research, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1557, 1567–
78, 1586–91 (2005) (reviewing prior empirical research and presenting the results of a case 
study finding arbitration faster and more efficient than litigation). 
 8. See Schwartz, supra note 7, at 1289–91; Sherwyn et al., supra note 7, at 1564–66. 
 9. Schwartz, supra note 7. 
 10. Professor Schwartz seems to have reached this conclusion as well. See, e.g., 
2012] SHIFTING THE PARADIGM 273 
 
 
arbitration that if this is something employers want, it must be something 
employees would prefer not to have. Why else would employers want something? 
Certainly not to give away money to employees. The suspicion is that employers 
self-select into mandatory arbitration programs in large part because they plan to 
use this system to repress employee rights and to reduce the employers’ costs of 
violating the law. Proponents of arbitration are equally entrenched in the view that 
these claims are inaccurate, and that it is unfair to assume that (a) employers are out 
to find ways of getting away with breaking the law and (b) employers that 
implement mandatory arbitration systems are doing something that is bad for 
employees. A common lesson taught to negotiators is to avoid the distributive 
bargaining “fixed-pie assumption,”—that what is good for your counterpart is 
axiomatically bad for you, or vice-versa—and to instead seek out integrative “win-
win” solutions that make the pie bigger for both you and your counterpart.11 
Supporters of mandatory arbitration continue to believe detractors are making this 
erroneous presumption about mandatory arbitration. 
Accepting the premise that arguing pro or con might be counterproductive, we 
went back to what originally attracted us to this issue—the proposition that the 
discrimination resolution system is broken and needs to be fixed. Simply changing 
the adjudication system for discrimination lawsuits will likely be insufficient on its 
own. Instead, we propose that we need to start from scratch by eliminating 
employment at-will. To paraphrase our 1999 article,12 instead of throwing out the 
bathwater and saving the baby, it is finally time—forty-six years after the passage 
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and eleven years after Gilmer—to birth 
a new baby. Before we can talk about how wonderful the new baby is, however, we 
need to explain why there is a need for a new system and why arbitration will not 
solve the problem on its own. 
I. THE PROBLEM WITH THE ARBITRATION FAIRNESS ACT OF 2009 
The Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009 (AFA) would have eliminated predispute 
mandatory arbitration.13 Professor Schwartz argues that postdispute voluntary 
                                                                                                                 
Schwartz, Set It Free, supra note 6, at 401 (“[T]he debate among legal commentators on [the 
fairness of mandatory arbitration] is now over a decade old [and] the debaters have long ago 
stopped listening to each other . . . .”); Schwartz, supra note 7, at 1335–36 (“I doubt whether 
the mind of a single participant in the mandatory arbitration debate has yet been changed by 
an existing empirical study, and . . . there is little reason to hope that will happen in the 
future.”). Although, anecdotally, one prominent academic, who shall remain anonymous, at 
least in this publication, has told me that (s)he was persuaded, in part by our arguments, to 
amend her/his pre-existing views on the subject that mandatory arbitration should be banned. 
(S)he is now of the mind that mandatory predispute arbitration offers significant trade-offs 
for justice for low-wage earners as compared to litigation. 
 11. Max H. Bazerman, Negotiator Judgment: A Critical Look at the Rationality 
Assumption, 27 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 211, 215–18 (1983). 
 12. Sherwyn et al., supra note 7.  
 13. See Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, S. 931, 111th Cong. § 3(a), 402(a) (2009) 
(“[N]o predispute arbitration agreement shall be valid or enforceable if it requires arbitration 
of an employment . . . dispute.”). The bill was introduced in the House of Representatives as 
well. H.R. 1020, 111th Cong. § 4, 2(b) (2009). In 2007, a bill to the same effect was 
introduced in the Senate and House of Representatives. See Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007, 
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arbitration is a viable alternative.14 We disagree and point to our 2003 study of a 
voluntary arbitration system in which the parties in over 200 cases received offers 
to arbitrate and in not one case did both parties agree.15 While we agree with 
Professor Schwartz that there are instances in which both parties should and would 
agree to arbitration, we contend that the number of such cases is so small that such 
a system would have no real effect on discrimination.16 In addition, it is not those 
cases that concern us. If there is a factual dispute in which each side has a 
reasonable interpretation of events, whether the parties agreed before the dispute 
arose or after is really irrelevant to the question of whether pre- or postdispute 
arbitration is better than the status quo—litigation. In such an instance, whether the 
parties litigate or arbitrate, neither side would be able to exploit the high costs and 
related barriers of litigation to leverage an unjust result. This is because the factual 
dispute is legitimate. The kinds of cases that are relevant to the inquiry are ones in 
which either bad-actor employers or bad-actor employees could exploit the high 
costs of litigation to leverage an unjust result in either forum. The bad actors 
(employers or employees with knowingly unwinnable cases) are able to exploit the 
high costs of defending or prosecuting litigation in order to compel the other side to 
settle for less than the high cost of winning. So, in these cases, we would prefer 
arbitration because that would reduce the costs of adjudication on the merits, and 
hence, reduce the ability to leverage those costs to achieve the unjust result. 
Postdispute voluntary arbitration will have no effect on bad-actor employers’ or 
bad-actor employees’ respective abilities or likelihoods of leveraging high costs to 
achieve unjust results. This is because after the dispute arises they are strongly 
incentivized against agreeing to the cheaper, faster forum. Therefore, only where 
the parties agreed to arbitrate claims before the dispute arose would the arbitration 
agreement prevent bad-actor employers or bad-actor employees from leveraging 
costs of litigation to achieve unjust results. 
Because voluntary arbitration is not really a solution, the AFA simply ensures 
the status quo—a perpetuation of unjust cost-driven exploitation by bad-actor 
employers and bad-actor employees. We are troubled when arbitration detractors 
fail to compare arbitration results to litigation results in a salient way,17 and believe, 
or by implication allege, that a “fair” system is one in which employees win at least 
50% of claims filed (independent of an assessment of the merits of the claims, or 
assuming that, all else equal, at least 50% of employee claims have merit).18 The 
first problem is simply an omission of facts to help support a conclusion that 
arbitration is unfair. Fortunately, the first problem seems to be resolved as scholars 
are now comparing the results of arbitration to litigation.19 The second problem, 
                                                                                                                 
S. 1782, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 3010, 110th Cong. (2007). 
 14. See Schwartz, supra note 2, at 119; Schwartz, Set It Free, supra note 6. 
 15. See Sherwyn, supra note 2, at 62–65. 
 16. Cf id. at 62 (premising that a participation rate of less than 1% of a court’s caseload 
would indicate that a voluntary arbitration system is ineffective). 
 17. Professor Schwartz attempts to address this shortcoming by arguing that the burden 
to prove, by empirical evidence, that arbitration is fair should be placed on advocates of 
mandatory arbitration. See Schwartz, supra note 7, at 1259–61. 
 18. See, e.g., id. at 1262–63 (measuring “fairness” by either aggregate pro-plaintiff 
outcomes or individual plaintiff recoveries). 
 19. See, e.g., Lewis L. Maltby, Private Justice: Employment Arbitration and Civil 
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however, is still an issue. Implicit in the arguments against mandatory arbitration 
and in favor of the AFA are three presumptions: (1) a fair system is one in which 
plaintiffs are compensated; (2) the vast majority of plaintiffs have been 
discriminated against and deserve remuneration; and (3) the current system is both 
fair and just for society as a whole. We contest each of these assertions.  
EEOC statistics, litigation statistics, and the costs of each of these systems, as 
well as our professional experiences, form the basis of our contention that the 
current system is “broken.” By this, we simply mean that the litigation system does 
a poor job of generating outcomes that approximate what outcomes would be if the 
normative outcomes were determined by an objective third-party observer with 
justice and the best interests of all U.S. citizens in mind. 
Observation and analysis of case outcomes puts forth a persuasive argument that 
the current system is ineffective. The EEOC classifies successful (i.e., pro-plaintiff) 
resolutions as “merit resolutions.”20 In the last fourteen years, merit resolutions as a 
proportion of total resolutions have ranged from a high of 22.9% (2007) to a low of 
11% (1997).21 This means that in 1997 the EEOC failed to find merit in 89% of the 
cases it resolved. The numbers look even worse when one considers that merit 
resolutions include settlements.22 Anyone who has practiced on either side of the 
table knows that a significant percentage of settlements are nuisance-value 
settlements, where the employer gives the employee an insignificant amount of 
money (or some nonmonetary consideration such as an apology or promise not to 
discriminate in the future) in order to avoid the costs of defense.23 This happens 
independently of any assessment of the merits. 
                                                                                                                 
Rights, 30 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 29, 46 (1998); Frederick L. Sullivan, Accepting 
Evolution in Workplace Justice: The Need for Congress to Mandate Arbitration, 26 W. NEW 
ENG. L. REV. 281, 308–12 (2004); Curtis Brown, Cost-Effective, Fast and Fair: What the 
Empirical Data Indicate About ADR, METRO. CORP. COUNS., Nov. 2004, at 56, 70 
(summarizing several empirical studies comparing litigation with arbitration). 
 20. A qualification is in order. “Merit resolutions . . . include negotiated settlements, 
withdrawals with benefits, successful conciliations, and unsuccessful conciliations.” 
Definitions of Terms, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPP. COMM’N, http://www.eeoc.gov/ 
eeoc/statistics/enforcement/definitions.cfm. “Successful conciliations” are settlements after 
the EEOC has found reasonable cause. Id. “Unsuccessful conciliations” are findings of cause 
that are not settled and thus considered by the EEOC for litigation. Id. However, “negotiated 
settlements” (settlements to which the EEOC is a party) and “withdrawals with benefits” 
(settlements to which the EEOC is not a party) may include some cases in which the EEOC 
has found reasonable cause. Id. Therefore, “merit resolutions” is not, by any measure, a 
perfectly accurate proxy for merit. Resolutions not classified as merit resolutions include 
“administrative closures” and findings of “no reasonable cause.” Id.  
 21. All Statutes: Fiscal Year 1997–Fiscal Year 2010, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPP. COMM’N 
[hereinafter EEOC Data], http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/all.cfm. 
 22. See EEO-1 Job Classification Guide, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPP. COMM’N, 
http://www.eeoc.gov/employers/eeo1survey/jobclassguide.cfm (describing each of the 
EEOC’s classifications). 
 23. We refer only to “nuisance-value settlements”—situations in which an employee 
brings a non-meritorious claim strategically to extract a settlement that is economical from 
the perspective of the employer. See generally Randy J. Kozel & David Rosenberg, Solving 
the Nuisance-Value Settlement Problem: Mandatory Summary Judgment, 90 VA. L. REV. 
1849, 1855–58 (2004) (defining the scope of the nuisance-value settlement problem). 
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Of course, one could argue persuasively that many meritorious cases are not 
classified as merit resolutions. Indeed, according to a 1988 General Accounting 
Office study,24 between 41% and 82% of no-cause findings were attributable to the 
EEOC’s failure to adequately investigate the charge.25 The EEOC numbers cited 
above imply that the vast majority of cases are without merit—an argument 
employers find appealing. Alternatively, plaintiffs and their lawyers will point to 
the GAO’s findings as calling into question the EEOC’s procedures.26 Not to be 
outdone, employers can raise issues with the EEOC procedures to support their 
own arguments. Accordingly, one could argue that certain EEOC and state agency 
procedures undermine the integrity of anti-discrimination laws and hurt both 
employees and employers. For example, because state agencies are compensated by 
the number of cases they bring in, there is an incentive to take any case and “fit” it 
into the framework provided by the statute.27 Bringing a large number of frivolous 
claims hurts both employers and employees.28 Employers are forced to waste 
significant resources defending these claims. Employees are faced with 
investigators, employers, lawyers, and judges who are so jaded that they rarely 
believe the plaintiff. In fact, we interviewed several investigators and asked them 
what their initial reactions to new cases are.29 Investigators stated that they believe 
discharge cases to be baseless before they open the files.30 The fact that 
investigators will pressure both sides to settle cases without discussing the merits 
further perpetuates what we have referred to as “de facto severance.”31 Not only has 
this problem not gone away since we first mentioned it,32 but it has been 
institutionalized with mediation.33 Regrettably, but understandably, the theme of 
                                                                                                                 
Nuisance-value settlements are distinguishable from “negative expected value claims”—
claims that may have merit but, for one reason or another, would be uneconomical for the 
charging party to pursue in court. See id. at 1903–04. See generally David C. Croson & 
Robert H. Mnookin, Scaling the Stonewall: Retaining Lawyers to Bolster Credibility, 1 
HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 65, 67–69 (1996) (presenting the model for the negative expected 
value claim).  
 24. The GAO has since changed its name to the Government Accountability Office. 
 25. GAO Report Charges EEOC with Failure to Fully Investigate Majority of 
Complaints, 198 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) A-7 (Oct. 13, 1988). 
 26. See id. 
 27. See U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPP. COMM’N, FY 2011 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET 
JUSTIFICATION 33 (2010) [hereinafter EEOC BUDGET JUSTIFICATION], available at 
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/plan/upload/Final-FY-2011-Congressional-Budget-
Justification.pdf. 
 28. See Sherwyn et al., supra note 7, at 80–89; Sherwyn, supra note 4, at 17–20. 
 29. See Sherwyn et al., supra note 7, at 86 n.68. 
 30. See id. 
 31. See id. at 81–83. “De facto severance,” in our parlance, is the payment an employer 
is willing to make to settle a nuisance-value unlawful discharge claim to avoid the cost of 
defense, which can be tremendous even in the face of a nonmeritorious claim. See Theodore 
J. St. Antoine, The Changing Role of Labor Arbitration, 76 IND. L.J. 83, 92 (2001) (“Even if 
successful, a defense before a jury may cost $100,000 to $200,000 or more.”). 
 32. See Sherwyn et al., supra note 7, at 81–83. 
 33. See The Charge Handling Process, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPP. COMM’N, 
http://eeoc.gov/employees/process.cfm (describing the agency’s procedures, which include 
mediation). 
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investigation and mediation is not answering the question, “Has this employer 
discriminated against this employee?” Instead, it is, “What is the minimum dollar 
amount the employer will pay, and the employee accept, to make this case go 
away?” 
Litigation statistics are similarly alarming. Employees should fare better in trials 
than employers for several reasons. First, the EEOC seemingly eliminates a large 
number of non-meritorious cases. When the EEOC administratively closes a case 
the employee cannot bring an action in court.34 In the last fourteen years, the 
percentage of administratively closed cases has ranged from a low of 16.4% (2005) 
to a high of 28.3% (1997).35 In that same time period the percentage of cases in 
which the EEOC found no cause ranged from 57.2% (2001) to 64.3% (2010) of the 
cases.36 While employees who receive a no cause finding may bring an action in 
court, it seems logical that plaintiffs’ lawyers would be wary of cases with a no 
cause finding and thus, would be less likely to take such cases on a contingency 
basis. Because the EEOC settlement and mediation procedures should, and do, 
weed out bad cases and because the procedures provide plaintiffs’ lawyers with 
significantly more information about discrimination cases than other types of 
contingency cases, one can assume that at least a majority of the cases that make it 
to litigation have merit.37 However, the majority of cases, according to the courts, 
do not have merit. 
Before trial, cases are often resolved by dispositive motions. Lewis Maltby 
found that, in 1994, federal courts resolved 2051 (60%) of their 3419 employment 
discrimination cases by pre-trial motions.38 Of these 2051 cases, employers 
prevailed in 2010 (98%).39 Thus, the trial statistics begin with almost 60% of the 
non-meritorious cases taken out of the pool. There are a number of scholars who 
have examined trial statistics. Howard found that employees prevailed at a rate of 
38% in front of juries and 19% in bench trials.40 Eisenberg and Hill found that in 
                                                                                                                 
 
 34. The reasons for closing a case administratively include:  
failure to locate charging party, charging party failed to respond to EEOC 
communications, charging party refused to accept full relief, closed due to the 
outcome of related litigation which establishes a precedent that makes further 
processing of the charge futile, charging party requests withdrawal of a charge 
without receiving benefits or having resolved the issue, no statutory 
jurisdiction.  
Definitions of Terms, supra note 20. 
 35. EEOC Data, supra note 21. 
 36. Id. 
 37. See Laura Beth Nielsen, Robert L. Nelson & Ryon Lancaster, Individual Justice or 
Collective Mobilization? Employment Discrimination Litigation in the Post Civil Rights 
United States, 7 J. EMP. LEGAL STUD. 175, 177 (2010) (“Although the EEOC occasionally 
provides a remedy and, according to plaintiffs’ lawyers, occasionally provides investigative 
material that may be useful at a later stage of litigation, most often the EEOC process results 
in considerable delay without producing meaningful investigation or conciliation.”). 
 38. Maltby, supra note 19, at 47. 
 39. Id. 
 40. See William M. Howard, Arbitrating Claims of Employment Discrimination: What 
Really Does Happen? What Really Should Happen?, DISP. RESOL. J., Oct.–Dec. 1995, at 40, 
41–42 (examining Federal Judicial Center data on federal employment case terminations 
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federal employment discrimination cases, the employee win rate was 36.4%.41 
Nielsen, Nelson, and Lancaster found that of 1672 employment discrimination 
cases filed in federal courts between 1988 and 2003, 19% were dismissed, 50% 
were settled early in the discovery process, 18% were dismissed on summary 
judgment, and another 8% were settled late, leaving plaintiffs to win at trial in only 
thirty-two cases, or 1.9%.42 When one combines the several studies and includes 
the pretrial motions, the employee win rate is significantly less than 15%. Of 
course, the employee win rate even in jury trials may be negatively affected by the 
difficulties of proving intent against employers savvy enough to avoid discovery of 
proverbial smoking gun evidence.43 Moreover, it is reasonable to assume that, like 
the worst cases, the best cases are removed from the pool by being settled and not 
adjudicated.44 Still, it seems difficult to justify an adjudication system where less 
than 15% of the cases are deemed meritorious, unless the system was so cost 
effective that the value of giving employees “their day in court” outweighed the 
costs. While we argue that could be the case in arbitration,45 it is clearly not the 
case in litigation. 
Litigation costs are outrageous. Management lawyers report that the EEOC 
process alone can cost up to $10,000.46 Taking a case to summary judgment will 
almost always cost over $50,000, and taking a case through trial will cost anywhere 
from $100,000 to over $1 million.47 There are two major problems with the costs of 
litigation. First, the almost standard operating procedure of employers settling 
baseless cases for the costs of defense flies in the face of justice, creates a cynicism 
about the process, and incentivizes employers to discriminate in hiring to avoid 
having to defend baseless claims when terminating employment of individuals in 
protected classes.48 Second, the high costs prevent anyone but highly paid 
                                                                                                                 
from June 1, 1992 to May 31, 1994). 
 41. See Theodore Eisenberg & Elizabeth Hill, Arbitration and Litigation of Employment 
Claims: An Empirical Comparison, DISP. RESOL. J., Nov. 2003–Jan. 2004, at 44, 48 & tbl.1 
(examining federal court trial data (1999–2000) gathered from the Administrative Office of 
the United States Courts).  
 42. Nielsen et al., supra note 37, at 187 fig.1. 
 43. See, e.g., Valentino v. Village of S. Chi. Heights, 575 F.3d 664, 672 (7th Cir. 2009) 
(“[I]t would be rare for a plaintiff to have smoking gun evidence . . . .”); Jakimas v. 
Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 485 F.3d 770, 785 (3d Cir. 2007) (similar); Jean R. Sternlight, In 
Search of the Best Procedure for Enforcing Employment Discrimination Laws: A 
Comparative Analysis, 78 TUL. L. REV. 1401, 1423 (2004) (“Absent ‘smoking gun’ evidence, 
which is rare, the cases are very difficult to prove.”). 
 44. See generally George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for 
Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 6–30 (1984) (presenting a model for selecting disputes for 
litigation). 
 45. See, e.g., Sherwyn et al., supra note 5, at 132–33. But see Stone, supra note 2, at 
1037 (arguing mandatory arbitration raises due process concerns in part because employees 
must pay their own attorney’s fees and often the arbitrator’s fee). 
 46. See Sherwyn et al., supra note 5, at 81 & n.39. 
 47. See Nancy Levit, Megacases, Diversity, and the Elusive Goal of Workplace Reform, 
49 B.C. L. REV. 367, 369 n.20 (2008) (listing attorney’s fees estimates of $250,000–
$450,000 for single employment discrimination claims and up to $7 million for class 
actions). 
 48. See John J. Donohue, III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment 
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employees from gaining access to the system. For example, as Professors John 
Donohue and Peter Siegelman concluded, it would not be economical for an 
employee to pursue a case unless the employee earned more than $22,500 per 
year.49 In a 1995 survey of plaintiffs’ lawyers, Howard found that lawyers would 
not take a case unless the employee had at least $60,000–$65,000 in provable back- 
pay damages.50 Furthermore, the survey found that plaintiffs’ lawyers require a 
$3000–$3600 retainer—tough to come up with if you have no job.51 
We contend that the EEOC/litigation system favors bad actors and hurts good 
actors. Bad-actor employers use the delays and costs inherent in the system to force 
employees to either accept nuisance settlements for legitimate claims or to even 
walk away because they cannot overcome the significant barriers to entry. 
Conversely, bad-actor employees leverage the disproportionately high costs of 
defense, as well as the threat of publicity, to extort employers into paying what we 
call, as stated above, “de facto severance.”  
We submit that arbitration solves many of these problems endemic to the 
EEOC/litigation system. Arbitration adjudication is significantly faster and cheaper 
than EEOC litigation. The average EEOC case takes 373 days to resolve, while the 
figure is 709 days in litigation.52 In our study of a company with an in-house 
arbitration system, we found that the average time to resolution was less than 
twenty-one days.53 Consequently, costs and lost productivity were minimized while 
the retention rates were extremely high in arbitration.54 Because arbitration is so 
much faster and cheaper than litigation, we contend that bad-actor employers will 
be drastically curtailed in their abilities to use their resources to wear down 
employees with legitimate claims. Similarly, bad-actor employees will not be able 
to extort employers into paying to avoid huge costs of winning on a motion at trial 
following what could be an extensive discovery process. Unflagging critics 
nevertheless contended that arbitration is a “rigged system” that favors 
employers.55 What constitutes an unfair system is, however, a question of 
perspective. As found in a 2005 Stanford Law Review article, arbitration win/loss 
rates are similar to that in litigation, and more “employee friendly” than that of the 
EEOC.56 We believe that reduced barriers to entry and similar or even better 
employee win/loss rates seemed like a positive outcome for employees. Similarly, 
                                                                                                                 
Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REV. 983, 1024 (1991) (arguing that when making 
hiring decisions, employers consider the probability and cost of potential litigation for future 
discriminatory firing, which applies particularly to female and minority candidates).  
 49. See id. at 1008. The calculation incorporated the probability of success at trial, the 
weeks of unemployment as a result of termination, and the costs of initiating the suit. Id. It 
found a $450 weekly salary to be the threshold, which is $22,500 for fifty weeks worked in a 
year. See id. This is roughly $36,100 when adjusted for inflation from 1991 dollars to 2010 
dollars. See CPI Inflation Calculator, BUREAU LAB. STAT., http://data.bls.gov/cgi-
bin/cpicalc.pl. 
 50. Howard, supra note 40, at 44. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Sherwyn et al., supra note 7, at 1588. 
 53. Id. at 1589 fig.3. 
 54. See id. at 1589. 
 55. Lorraine M. Brennan, CPR News, 27 ALT. TO HIGH COST LITIG. 98, 112 (2009) 
(quoting a Washington, DC public interest attorney). 
 56. See Sherwyn et al., supra note 7, at 1578. 
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we believe that employers would be better off with arbitration because the 
reduction in time and costs of defense would result in: (1) less productive time lost 
and (2) significant reduction of settlements of frivolous cases entered into to avoid 
the high cost of defense. Thus, good-actor employees would be rewarded as their 
claims would be heard; good-actor employers would be rewarded as they would be 
able to reasonably defend their cases; bad-actor employers could no longer leverage 
time and expense to stymie just results; and bad-actor employees could no longer 
extort de facto severance. Thus, we believe that arbitration results in a system that 
is more just than EEOC and litigation.  
There are, however, problems with arbitration. For example, the fact that it is 
private reduces the disincentive to discriminate (on the other hand it also reduces 
the incentive to use the law to extort money when there is no legitimate claim); it 
does not allow for the development of the law (arbitration decisions have no real 
precedential value); it may provide a disincentive for plaintiffs’ lawyers to take the 
case;57 and the “repeat player” effect may result in a system that favors 
employers.58 We believe the problems are either overstated or can be corrected59 by 
our proposed statute, the Mandatory Arbitration Act (MAA).60 The MAA provides 
the following: 
1. Filing of Claims 
All employers with arbitration policies must submit copies of such 
policies to the EEOC within fifteen days of their enactment. Prior to 
submitting their cases to arbitration, employees may file their claims 
with the EEOC. The EEOC will have thirty days to determine if the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 57. One would expect a plaintiff’s attorney to welcome arbitration. Because it is both 
cheaper and faster, it should result in a higher “effective hourly rate” over time than 
litigation, even when considering the probability of success and average damages awards. 
However, plaintiffs’ attorneys harbor some of the same fears of arbitration as defense 
attorneys. See Sherwyn, supra note 4, at 41–46. For more on the concept of “effective hourly 
rate” and contingent-fee attorney case management, see generally Herbert M. Kritzer, Seven 
Dogged Myths Concerning Contingency Fees, 80 WASH. UNIV. L.Q. 739, 761–72 (2002). 
 58. For more on the “repeat player” effect, see Lisa B. Bingham, Employment 
Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, 1 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 189 (1997); Lisa B. 
Bingham, Is There a Bias in Arbitration of Nonunion Employment Disputes? An Analysis of 
Actual Cases and Outcomes, 6 INT’L J. CONFLICT MGMT. 369 (1995); Lisa B. Bingham, On 
Repeat Players, Adhesive Contracts, and the Use of Statistics in Judicial Review of 
Employment Arbitration Awards, 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 223 (1998). 
 59. See Sherwyn et al., supra note 5, at 125–28 (presenting the Model Arbitration Act, a 
proposal designed to address critics’ concerns about mandatory arbitration). 
 60. We drafted the Model Arbitration Act for employment discrimination claims after 
studying Gilmer, the conclusions of the Dunlop Commission on the Future of Worker-
Management Relations, and the arguments made by the EEOC and other numerous critics of 
mandatory arbitration. Additionally, we consulted both the American Arbitration 
Association’s Rules for the Resolution of Employment Disputes and the CPR Institute for 
Dispute Resolution’s model rules for arbitrations. Accordingly, the MAA specifically 
addresses many of the problems identified by the Court, commission, and critics. If adopted, 
the MAA would provide employers with a statutorily enforceable arbitration policy. While 
parties would always be free to contract out of the MAA’s provisions, such agreements 
would be unenforceable if contested. 
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case fits within its national enforcement plan. If so, and if the employee 
wishes the Agency to be involved in the case, the EEOC may litigate on 
behalf of the plaintiff(s) or class. If the employee does not wish the 
EEOC to be involved, or if the case does not fit into the EEOC’s 
national enforcement plan, the case will be deferred to arbitration. 
 
2. The Law and Damages 
The arbitrators must follow applicable federal and state substantive law. 
Arbitrators must comply with the statutorily prescribed damage 
provisions. 
 
3. Establishment of a Body to License, Select, and Monitor Arbitrators 
Congress shall create or empower an agency that serves three functions: 
licensing, selecting, and monitoring arbitrators. 
a. Licensing 
Unlike labor arbitrators, employment discrimination arbitrators need 
to be trained in the law of the land, not the law of the shop. The 
agency will establish criteria that all discrimination arbitrators must 
meet. These criteria will include education and practical experience 
in the field. A mandatory licensing exam will ensure that the 
arbitrators are knowledgeable in the applicable law. From those that 
are licensed, the agency will establish a panel of a limited number of 
arbitrators for each geographic area. 
b. Selection 
When a case is set for arbitration the agency will randomly select 
seven arbitrators from its panel. The arbitrators will be submitted to 
the parties. Each party will have one peremptory challenge and 
unlimited challenges for cause. An arbitrator will be randomly 
selected from those who are not disqualified. 
c. Monitoring Arbitrators 
Arbitrators will be required to file written opinions with the agency 
and the EEOC. The arbitrators will delete the names of the employer 
and the employee from the opinion. These opinions must describe: 
(1) the facts of the case; (2) the applicable legal standards; and (3) 
the application of the law to the facts so that the conclusion drawn 
can be understood. The agency will continually employ experts in 
the field to review the cases of the arbitrators to ensure that they are 
qualified to remain on the panel. The EEOC can use these opinions 
to ensure that arbitrators are applying the law correctly. If not, the 
EEOC can draft new regulations, propose new legislation to 
Congress, or make the issue part of its national enforcement plan. 
 
4. Arbitration Procedures  
a. Discovery 
The parties will be allowed document requests as well as a limited 
number of interrogatories and depositions. The parties can depose 
the plaintiffs, defendants, and the defendants’ decision makers. The 
parties must submit a witness list one month prior to arbitration. All 
discovery must be completed within three months of the case being 
deferred to arbitration. 
b. Burden of Proof 
The burden of proof will be in accordance with federal law. 
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c. Damages 
All damages provided by the Title VII, the ADA, and the ADEA, 
including attorney’s fees, will be available. 
d. Rules of Evidence  
Arbitrators are permitted discretion in rendering appropriate, yet 
simplified, rules of evidence and procedure. 
e. Costs 
The employer will be liable for the cost of the arbitration. Each party 
will bear all of its own other costs. 
 
5. Arbitration Agreements  
Arbitration agreements cannot be part of an employee handbook. 
Instead, they must be embodied in the form of a separate document that 
clearly states the parameters of the agreement. For example, the 
document must state if employment is at-will or not. It must also 
inform employees that they are free to hire counsel and file claims with 
appropriate government agencies.61 
We contend that arbitration accompanied by the MAA provides a more just 
system than litigation for resolving employment rights disputes. Despite our 
beliefs, however, the fact is arbitration is still regarded as a form of rustic justice 
and has not been widely accepted. Because there seems little room to correct 
arbitration’s ills, the paradigm offered is to either simply revert back to 
EEOC/litigation or to develop a new method for addressing this issue. Because we 
find the EEOC/litigation paradigm untenable, we suggest developing a new system 
to cure the ills of the current system.  
Scholars, lawyers, advocates, legislators, and other interested parties have been 
attempting to develop a new system for resolving employment disputes for 
decades. From administrative agencies to litigation, to mediation, to arbitration, to 
work tribunals, there have been innumerable attempts to try to address the classic 
battle between labor and capital. We do not pretend that we, in limited space, can 
devise the perfect system. We do, however, believe that it is time to change the 
debate from “arbitration or not” to: “EEOC/litigation is not working and we need to 
develop something different.” Accordingly, in the remaining space allowed, we 
propose a new way to address discrimination and the vast majority of 
discrimination disputes—the first step of which is to eliminate employment at-will.  
II. ELIMINATING EMPLOYMENT AT-WILL CAN FIX THE DISCRIMINATION PROBLEM 
We believe that one of the root causes of the problems with the current system is 
de facto severance.62 The ability to receive de facto severance encourages the filing 
of false discharge claims. The proliferation of false discharge claims (1) causes 
delays; (2) increases costs; (3) forces nuisance settlements; and (4) undermines the 
legitimacy of the law and the system. Of course, there are false failure to hire and 
harassment cases.63 Because failure to hire cases are difficult to prove,64 employers 
                                                                                                                 
 
 61. Sherwyn et al., supra note 5, at 125–28 (citation omitted). 
 62. See Antoine, supra note 31. 
 63. Indeed, many employers report that employees file harassment cases to set up 
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are less apt to settle them, and bad-actor employees are less likely to file them. 
Similarly, harassment claims (not associated with a termination) can be 
investigated and resolved by parties who still maintain working relationships. 
Therefore, these cases do not lend themselves to the perverse incentives of de facto 
severance, or are at least significantly less likely to do so. Thus, we attempt to 
attack the discrimination problem by addressing terminations. 
A. The Problems 
As a threshold matter, the fact that the vast majority of discrimination cases are 
discharge cases is a problem.65 The purpose of the discrimination statutes is, in 
large part, to open doors to those in protected classes, and to effect social change.66 
Indeed, after the passage of the ADA, Senator Edward Kennedy referred to it as the 
“emancipation proclamation for the disabled.”67 In practice, however, up to 86% of 
all discrimination cases filed with the EEOC are discharge cases.68 Thus, one can 
cynically spin discrimination lawsuits as follows: when hiring, the company is an 
equal opportunity employer. With regard to employees, however, the company 
discriminates and, in fact, fires people because of their race, sex, color, national 
origin, religion, age, and disability. Of course, this theory is not foolproof and there 
are several explanations of the large percentage of discharge cases. For example, 
one could argue that the decision makers change in between hiring and the decision 
to terminate,69 which happens often in larger bureaucratically structured 
organizations. Similarly, it is sometimes the case that hiring is either an automated 
process or outsourced to consulting companies, but decisions to promote, retain, or 
terminate employees are performed internally. Perhaps a more compelling and non-
mutually exclusive argument is that discrimination in the twenty-first century is 
                                                                                                                 
retaliation cases. See Howard Zimmerle, Common Sense v. the EEOC: Co-Worker Ostracism 
and Shunning as Retaliation Under Title VII, 30 J. CORP. L. 627, 642 (2005) (“There is also 
the possibility that an attorney will ‘set up’ an employer for a lawsuit by bringing a baseless 
harassment claim but waiting for retaliatory conduct on which to base a retaliation 
lawsuit.”).  
 64. This is another problem with discrimination law that is beyond the scope of this 
Article. 
 65. See John J. Donohue, III & Peter Siegleman, Law and Macroeconomics: 
Employment Discrimination Litigation Over the Business Cycle, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 709 
(1993). 
 66. Nielsen et al., supra note 37, at 177–80. 
 67. Press Release, Senator Edward M. Kennedy, Statement of Senator Kennedy Praising 
Senate Passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act (Sept. 7, 1989), available at 
http://tedkennedy.org/page/-/legacy/pdf/kennedy-speech-1989-ADA.pdf. 
 68. See Vincent J. Roscigno & Lisette Garcia, Race Discrimination in Employment, in 
THE FACE OF DISCRIMINATION: HOW RACE AND GENDER IMPACT WORK AND HOME LIVES 21, 
26–27 & fig.1.3 (2007); Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 48, at 1016 (data from 1985); 
Nielsen et al., supra note 37, at 190, 200 (reporting 60% of cases involved firing, and noting 
that “private sector EEOC cases overwhelmingly involve firing”). 
 69. A change in decision maker, of course, might account for the occasional 
discriminatory firing. See, e.g., Thomas v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F.3d 38, 44–46 (1st Cir. 
1999) (finding discrimination where a change in the plaintiff’s supervisor marked a 
noticeable difference in performance reviews ultimately leading to the plaintiff’s layoff). 
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subtle. Decision makers hold members of protected classes to different standards, 
set them up to fail, often do not realize their biases,70 and, if they do, very rarely 
leave a smoking gun. That is, it is possible for decision makers to hold negative 
views of minorities in protected categories, but know it is wrong not to hire people 
in that category (because it is illegal, or even because of extra-legal socio-
normative constraints). When these biased decision makers review performance or 
other metrics, this bias might manifest in weighting performance of those in the 
protected category lower than those not in the protected category. Thus, we are not 
saying that there is no discrimination in terminations. What we are saying is that 
many of the discharge cases processed through the EEOC are not discrimination 
claims and would not have been filed as such if employees had other recourse—
which employees now lack.  
Employees who believe they were terminated unfairly, even if not 
discriminatorily, soon find that their only recourse is to file a discrimination 
charge.71 Such “false,” “square peg in a round hole” charges are facilitated by 
several key features: (1) the EEOC and state agencies are in the business of 
bringing claims and thus, their funding is dependent on claims coming through the 
door;72 (2) if one is terminated unfairly, it is natural to try to fit the facts of the 
termination into actionable boxes as described on websites like the EEOC’s;73 and 
(3) the majority of American employees believe that they cannot be fired without 
                                                                                                                 
 
 70. One study put it this way:   
[b]ecause aversive racists consciously endorse egalitarian values and deny their 
negative feelings about Blacks, they will not discriminate directly and openly in 
ways that can be attributed to racism. However, because of their negative 
feelings, they will discriminate, often unintentionally, when their behavior can 
be justified on the basis of some factor other than race . . . . 
John F. Dovidio, Samuel L. Gaertner, Kerry Kawakami & Gordon Hodson, Why Can’t We 
All Just Get Along? Interpersonal Biases and Interracial Distrust, 8 CULT. DIVERSITY & 
ETHNIC MINORITY PSYCHOL. 88, 90 (2002) (finding subjects displayed racial bias in selecting 
candidates for a job only when there was more discretion, that is, where competing 
candidates were neither clearly qualified nor clearly unqualified). See generally Franita 
Tolson, The Boundaries of Limiting Unconscious Discrimination: Firm-Based Remedies in 
Response to a Hostile Judiciary, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 347, 355–96 (2008) (discussing 
“unconscious discrimination” and the lack of success in court of plaintiffs alleging 
unconscious employment discrimination).  
 71. Because every state except for Montana is an employment at-will state, there is no 
cause of action for “wrongful discharge.” Because the majority of employees do not have 
contracts and the other employment protections are more specific, discrimination becomes 
the cause of action of last resort.  
 72. See generally EEOC BUDGET JUSTIFICATION, supra note 27, at 1–2 (setting forth 
reasons for the budget increase and listing performance metrics).  
 73. As the EEOC website describes, “If you plan to file a lawsuit alleging 
discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex (including pregnancy), national 
origin, age (40 or older), disability, genetic information, or retaliation, you first have to file a 
charge with one of our field offices (unless you plan to bring your lawsuit under the Equal 
Pay Act, which allows you to go directly to court without filing a charge).” Filing a Lawsuit, 
U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPP. COMM’N, http://www.eeoc.gov/employees/lawsuit.cfm. 
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cause.74 Accordingly, people who truly believe an unfair termination is unlawful 
will often, with or without the encouragement of their peers, attorneys, and the 
EEOC, file claims. The proliferation of wrongful discharge cases being miscast as 
discrimination claims overwhelms the system and increases the rate at which true 
discrimination cases are either settled for nuisance value, lost in the system, or 
otherwise mishandled leading to less recovery than justified. One could 
characterize this effect as a negative externality of misclassifying unfair 
terminations as discrimination. In addition, some larger institutional employers may 
regard the higher percentage of claims filed against them that do not rightfully 
belong in one of the discrimination check-box categories as costs of doing business, 
devoid of the signal that there may be real discriminatory practices occurring in 
their workplaces that need correction. Even more troubling is the fact that 
employers, fearing that they cannot fire “protected class” employees, may 
discriminate in hiring to ensure a homogeneous workplace less susceptible to legal 
attack.75 We contend we can solve the de facto severance system, reduce the EEOC 
and federal court docket, change the way employers view discrimination charges, 
and greatly reduce the incentive to discriminate by eliminating employment at-
will.76 
B. The Proposed Solution 
While the devil is, of course, in the details that cannot be fleshed out in the 
limited space we have, the remainder of this Article will outline a new employment 
standard that will provide employees with protection, allow employers to operate 
with certainty, and restore creditability and accountability to the discrimination 
law. We propose that employees engaged in interstate commerce can be terminated 
only if there is cause for the termination or severance pay given in lieu thereof. 
The concept of cause is probably the most difficult aspect of any reduction or 
elimination of employment at-will. “Cause” as applied in the union setting may 
have led some to believe that employers can rarely, if ever, terminate an employee. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 74. See Pauline T. Kim, Bargaining With Imperfect Information: A Study of Worker 
Perceptions of Legal Protection in an At-Will World, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 105, 110 (1997) 
(finding 89% of survey respondents erroneously believed that being fired out of personal 
dislike would be unlawful even absent discriminatory animus); cf. Zev J. Eigen, The Devil in 
the Details: The Interrelationship Among Citizenship, Rule of Law and Form-Adhesive 
Contracts, 41 CONN. L. REV. 381, 381 (2008) (finding 31% of respondents at a company 
believed the mandatory arbitration clause in the employment agreement they signed would 
be unenforceable).  
 75. See Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 48, at 1024. 
 76. The concept of employment at-will is the Mark Twain of labor and employment 
law—its death has been greatly exaggerated. In the 1950s, the rise of unions led to the 
pronouncement that employment at-will was dead. In the 1960s, 70s, 80s, and 90s, it was the 
discrimination law, the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and the public policy 
exception that were supposed to swallow the rule. In 2010, however, employment at-will is 
still the standard in forty-nine of the fifty states. It is well beyond the scope of this Article to 
argue the merits or shortcomings of employment at-will in a vacuum. Instead, we contend 
that because of public perception, the discrimination law, and other statutory and common 
law exceptions to employment at-will, its continued existence is no longer tenable.  
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Indeed, labor arbitration reports contain a fair number of discharge cases in which 
seemingly outrageous employee behavior did not prevent arbitrator orders of 
reinstatement with no back pay or, even worse, reinstatement with full back pay.77 
Accordingly, there are those who argue that cause in the union setting is found 
most often in extreme or outrageous employee conduct, but much less consistently 
and perhaps less frequently in less clear factually disputed cases. While employers 
may argue that it is nearly impossible to fire a union employee, in an unpublished 
manuscript Professor Laura Cooper found that employers in the union context 
prevail in 60.37% of cases in which the alleged basis of “cause” is unsatisfactory 
performance.78 When found in employment contracts, terminations for cause are 
often limited to theft, drugs, violence, and moral turpitude. There are, however, 
state court cases in which courts apply a broader definition of the term “cause.” We 
propose that in addition to obvious infractions, such as violence, drug use, and 
theft, “cause” should include: (1) violation of evenly applied work rules and (2) 
documented poor performance. The actual definition of cause would have to be 
further developed.  
Our system has several parts. First, employers that wish to terminate an 
employee who has worked for the employer for more than 180 days must have 
cause or must provide severance. The severance requirement is simple: the 
employer must provide the employee with two weeks’ severance for each year the 
employee worked with a minimum of two weeks and maximum of fifty-two weeks. 
Employers who do not assert having cause must offer severance. Employees have a 
choice. If they accept the severance pay out, they are precluded from filing a 
discrimination charge. Employees who refuse the money may force the employer 
into a newly created adjudicative system. Employers who have cause also have a 
choice. They can either offer the employee full or partial severance, or adjudicate 
the issue of cause. 
The adjudication system will be a combination of employer and government 
administration. Employers will be required to have a two-step grievance procedure 
that includes meetings with the decision maker and the employer’s director of 
human resources or an executive. If the case is not resolved informally, the case 
will be heard by administrative law judges (ALJs) who are employed by an 
appropriate agency that will administer the process. The ALJs will hear cases in an 
informal legal proceeding. There will be limited discovery, relaxed rules of 
evidence, no motions, and informal post-hearing letter briefs that either side may 
submit. Employees who can show financial hardship will be assigned counsel 
(either via pro bono work provided by private firms or by government employees 
like the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB)).  
A prevailing employer will not owe the employee any severance and will have 
successfully precluded the employee from filing a discrimination lawsuit. 
Employees who prevail will receive severance, costs and fees, and a right to sue 
letter to file a discrimination case in court. Thus, before defending discrimination 
                                                                                                                 
 
 77. See FRANK ELKOURI & EDNA ASPER ELKOURI, HOW ARBITRATION WORKS 281 (4th 
ed. 1985).  
 78. Professor Cooper, along with Professors Stephen Befort and Mario Bognanno, 
analyzed over 2000 labor arbitration discipline and discharge cases, published and 
unpublished, over twenty-four years in a single state.  
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discharge cases, the employer will have to prove that it had cause. Employers that 
fail to prove cause will face discrimination litigation with the full damages set forth 
in antidiscrimination statutes.  
This new system will not affect harassment cases, failure to hire cases, or any 
other case in which employees have not lost their jobs. What it will do is remove 
many of the wrongful discharge and de facto severance cases from the 
discrimination litigation mix. This will make the system significantly more 
manageable and should reduce the perverse incentives that favor bad-actor 
employers and employees discussed above. Bad-actor employers will be unable to 
force the employee to wait more than one year for the EEOC to “resolve” the case 
and, instead, will have to provide severance pay, costs, and fees after a relatively 
quick process. Bad-actor employees will not be able to extort money based on 
outrageous costs of defense. Employers will no longer fear hiring those employees 
in protected classes and will have to apply policies fairly and document infractions. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article suggests a shift away from the paradigm of arguing in favor of or 
against mandatory arbitration as a means of adjudicating employment rights 
disputes. Instead, we offer an outline of a proposal that seeks more fair, just, and 
accessible means of redress in the workplace. Our hope is to identify systematic 
flaws in the existing system and to focus attention on problems that are less 
controversial than what has become a focal point in academic discussions of ways 
to ameliorate the status quo. Much of the discourse around the question of how to 
improve workplace dispute resolution and reduce discrimination in the workplace 
has focused too much on win rates and too little on understanding how pathways to 
disputes create incentives to frame, defend, and resolve claims brought. Citing high 
employer win rates—often while implicitly or explicitly presuming that employees 
should win about 50% of claims filed—some commentators conclude that the 
current system is unfair for employees and that the way to fix this is to jump on the 
teeter-totter to propel the employee win rate up. This is one of the ways that some 
have justified banning mandatory arbitration, arguing that since it is picked by 
employers it must be something that they use to leverage disproportionately and 
inappropriately high (greater than 50%) win rates. The conclusion they reach is that 
banning mandatory arbitration will eliminate this assumed injustice. Sidestepping 
this debate, we offer what we allege to be a more productive focus and framing for 
the conversation. Hopefully, by focusing more on the incentives generated by the 
realities of the current system, we can move the conversation forward. We think 
that our proposal about eliminating at-will is one way of doing this.79  
In an ideal world of unlimited resources, the goal of employment litigation 
functioning as a means of reducing workplace discrimination might be a reasonable 
one. However, because the litigation system is fraught with economically 
                                                                                                                 
 
 79. There are good permutations of policy amendments that would complement the 
contemplated proposal. For instance, some discuss the importability of features of the United 
Kingdom’s approach to workplace dispute resolution. See Estreicher & Eigen, supra note 4. 
Such views are complimentary to the proposals expressed herein.  
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motivated incentives and disincentives for both employers and employees, we have 
learned over time that this goal is not one that is attainable (at least most of the 
time) through litigation alone. As Nielsen, Nelson, and Lancaster note, 
“[e]mployment discrimination litigation is not so much an engine for social change, 
or even a forum for carefully judging the merits of claims of discrimination, as it is 
a mechanism for channeling and deflecting individual claims of workplace 
injustice.”80 It is time to concern ourselves more with fixing a broken system to 
augment access and permit more employee voice through fair adjudicatory systems, 
than to worry about the smaller volume of employee beneficiaries of the existing 
system. We are hopeful that continued empirical work exploring the incentives and 
mechanisms underlying the existing system’s results will help propel the 
conversation beyond banning mandatory arbitration towards a more productive one 
about constructing an accessible, fast, cost effective, reliable means of providing 
wronged employees redress. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 80. Nielsen et al., supra note 37, at 196. 
